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ABSTRACT 
By analysing the industrial conflict that has affected the Indian Maruti Suzuki since 2011/2012, the 
article reflects on the meaning of the lean manufacturing paradigm today. It explores what continues 
to make it dominant, and the ultimate frontiers it has reached. It argues that its global significance 
could not have been established without the exploitation of local labour regimes, and without 
stretching their competitive advantage to the detriment of workers. In particular, the desirable 
condition now sought at global level is the possibility of relying on regimes based on high levels of 
casualisation, allowing the progressive “substitution” of permanent workers. However, as the Maruti 
case also reveals, working-class composition and the sustainability of the local labour process can 
generate mechanisms and unexpected alliances that could potentially destabilise the system. Indeed, 
the case shows how corporate strategies intended to fragment and depoliticise labour, inbuilt into the 
paradigm, were directly challenged and encountered resistance. Ultimately, though, the case also shows 
how, without strong legal and political support, the potential of a labour movement can be suffocated 
by institutionalised violence. In this sense, lean reacts, and the despotic imposition of consent becomes 
visible as never before.  
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Introduction: A Milestone within Indian Industrial Relations 
In 2011/2012, an unprecedented wave of strikes shook the Delhi auto cluster in the Indian National 
Capital Region (NCR). Workers from one of the Indian auto “champions”, Maruti Suzuki, engaged in 
one of the most prolonged and intense forms of collective action that India witnessed since 
liberalisation. In the industrial history of the region, the strike was unprecedented in all respects. It was 
unprecedented for its duration, the modalities of struggle, and the demands that were raised. It was 
unprecedented for the composition of the workers who took action, and for the unity and solidarity 
they managed to build, despite the imposed lines of fragmentation. It was unprecedented for the 
violent repression that followed, leading to the utter violation not only of labour and union rights, but 
also of basic human rights. It was unprecedented for its legal outcomes and the use of institutional 
coercion, which make it one of the worst onslaughts on labour India has seen in recent times.  
Overall, the Maruti dispute undoubtedly set a milestone within Indian industrial relations, and 
within the industrial development trajectory the country has followed in the past few decades. It is 
therefore a story worth exploring. Indeed, inscribed into a broader study of management and 
production strategies, and of industrial relations in the global auto industry, such a case may prompt 
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interesting insights on what lean manufacturing means today. For instance, it may contribute to an 
understanding of the practical implications of the model, and of the ultimate frontiers it has reached. 
Looking at labour, the story not only represents an extreme case in terms of reliance on casualisation 
as a competitive advantage, but also provides a unique example of solidarity bonds expressly built to 
challenge it. Eventually, despite its dramatic outcome, the case may still teach important lessons, both 
on capital strategies and on labour organising.  
Drawing on empirical literature on lean manufacturing (Charron and Stewart, 2004; Stewart et 
al., 2004, 2009; Danford et al., 2008; Pulignano et al., 2008), seen as the expression of well-defined 
politics of production (Burawoy, 1985), and based on field research conducted in the NCR auto cluster in 
2011/2012,1 this article builds on the Maruti case to discuss what such lessons could be. 
 
 
Lean in Practice and the Maruti Model 
A look at the distance between the narrative that still accompanies the lean production model and its 
practical implications may provide important interpretative keys for the analysis of contemporary 
processes of industrial restructuring. Firstly, it may lead to further questioning of the universal 
applicability and global significance of the original lean recipe (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990) by 
highlighting the fundamental role played by local conditions and labour regimes in determining the 
success of the model. Secondly, it may help debunk myths associated with the lean discourse by 
disclosing the gap between its rhetorical claims and the “lived experiences” of industrial restructuring. 
Thirdly, the analysis of corporate strategies following the implementation of the model, and of forms 
of resistance to it, may contribute to identifying potentially sensitive areas affecting its outcomes and 
where its weaknesses could lie.  
Twenty-five years ago, the lean production paradigm, as first designed within the Toyota factory, 
was presented as a revolutionary recipe that would re-shape the destiny not only of the global auto 
industry, but of the entire manufacturing system worldwide (Womack et al., 1990). In its ideal design, 
the term lean alludes to a light, agile system of production and management, where all unnecessary 
burdens are eliminated – excess stocks, prolonged times, superfluous spaces and unneeded human 
efforts – within a flexible structure that aims at optimising times and linkages between producer and 
consumer on the one side, and between managers and employees on the other. Overall, the system 
generally entailed changes in the production planning process in order to adapt to customer 
preferences, the reorganisation of spaces and times of manufacturing operations within and outside 
the factory, and workers’ involvement through the establishment of new company values. In practice, 
the built-to-order system, or just-in-time achieved through the kanban method,2 often requires the spatial 
restructuring of production operations and the vertical disintegration of manufacturing activities.3 
                                                          
1 The field research involved interviews with unions present in the area, business associations, a Maruti manager, 
focus groups with workers, and a questionnaire survey on “Working and Living Conditions in the NCR Auto 
Sector”, comprising 140 valid responses from both original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers. 
2 Method to control the whole logistics of the chain in order to reduce the accumulation of stocks to the bare 
minimum by setting a strict limit to the work-in-progress inventory.   
3 This includes processes of clusterisation, outsourcing, and the progressive formation of production chains, all 
aimed at the flexibilisation of productive relations between assemblers and component suppliers. For recent 
research, also on India, see Tewari (2008), Knorringa (2005), Das (2005) and Landy and Chaudhuri (2004).   
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Inside the factory, while restructuring often involves a reorganisation of assembly lines, a system to 
quickly detect production flaws is also devised, based on the idea of involving all workers in the attempt 
to ensure continuous improvements – known as kaizen – in the manufacturing process. The 
engagement of workers is also achieved via the creation of teams and the appeal to company values, 
reinforced through the provision of material incentives.4 Here, the objective is to let workers develop 
a sense of belonging, of ownership of the activities they undertake, and of responsibility towards their 
fellows. 
Today, almost three decades after the formal introduction of the model, its real meaning, 
implications and impact can be analysed rather distinctly. While it has undoubtedly spread worldwide, 
to the extent of permeating the productive rationale of economic sectors well beyond manufacturing,5 
the lean paradigm was rarely applied integrally, often encountered glitches, and reached very different 
outcomes depending on the context. There is no doubt that its implementation disclosed a substantial 
gap between the rhetorical announcements that accompanied its introduction, and the lived 
experiences of those who enable the lean factory to function – the workers. When lean was translated 
into practice, not only did the demand for labour flexibility enormously surpass the innovations 
implemented within the factory’s productive process, but all forms of required flexibilisation had a 
negative and heavy impact on the workforce. In this sense, restructuring generally caused the 
intensification of the working pace and of the pressure put on workers. In addition, the internal 
disintegration of manufacturing activities and the subsequent outsourcing of productive segments to 
external firms were often accompanied by processes of informalisation and growing insecurity in 
employment relations. Finally, far from leading to a progressive empowerment of the labour force, the 
flexibility imposed on workers – a crucial node of the lean manufacturing system – rather contributed 
to its increasing precarisation and depoliticisation. In this sense, and as the Indian case will show, while 
political neutralisation appears to be an essential ingredient to secure consensus (CRS, 2011), it does 
not always succeed.  
Concerning concrete manifestations of the lean model, there is a rich literature reporting how 
its “lived experiences” mostly resulted in a further burden imposed on workers. For example, Moody 
(1997) clearly illustrates how the employers’ demand for functional, numerical and time flexibility, to 
which the workforce is expected to conform, often translated into the free allocation of workers 
according to temporary industrial needs, and arbitrary adjustments to the number of workers employed 
and the length of operations they performed. Such adjustments are either managed internally, through 
the pursuit of specific corporate strategies like sub-contracting part of the workforce to external 
companies or recruitment agencies, and the increasing employment of casual/temporary workers, who 
are easy to dismiss. Or, otherwise, pressure is put externally by lobbying political institutions for the 
flexibilisation of labour market regulations: easier hiring and firing procedures, fewer limitations on 
the use of contract labour, and simplification of bargaining mechanisms.  
Overall, the application of the core “tenets” of the lean paradigm revealed a reality fairly distant 
from the promised ideal type. For example, Cardoso (2004) spells out how the restructuring of 
workplace relations at the Betim FIAT plant in Brazil, the consequent allocation of workers to 
                                                          
4 Like seniority bonuses or productivity prizes, or the promise of long-term employment, sometimes even lasting 
for life (Womack et al., 1990). 
5 See, for example, the studies conducted by Carter et al. (2011, 2013) on the UK civil service. 
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elementary working units (EWUs), and the distribution of both material and symbolic benefits, which 
was meant to secure loyalty to the benevolent Familia FIAT, hid a well-designed model of factory 
control. This also manifested in the selection of a greenfield site with no history of labour organisation 
and through repeated, firm anti-union behaviour. Examining cases of restructuring at FIAT, Renault 
and Volkswagen, Pulignano and Stewart (2008) note how the implementation of teamwork was 
expressly employed as a tool to discipline workers, whereas the systematic use of punitive measures 
and reward mechanisms in the form of welfare benefits and incentives acted as a structure for labour 
regulations aimed at controlling labour. Stewart et al. (2009) further underline how, even where worker 
involvement and worker autonomy were somewhat promoted, their meaning was nevertheless defined 
by management itself. No spontaneous and self-determined organisation was contemplated, while 
union representation and independent actions were radically obstructed within a broader design of 
labour de-politicisation and conflict prevention.  
In the same way, the idea of continuous improvements seems to represent the pursuit of 
continuous cost reduction rather than actually providing any substantive betterment of either product 
quality or working conditions (Moody, 1997; Pries, 2004). Productive improvements were often 
achieved through the partial reorganisation of assembly lines. Thus, spaces between workers and 
workstations were reduced, tasks were standardised, and work pace was made uniform. This translated 
into increasing pressure on the line, intensifying rhythms and heightening stress. Investigating the 
impact of lean manufacturing on labour within the British auto-component segment, Danford (2004) 
notes how the combination of team-working and the kaizen methodology intensifies disciplinary 
pressure and more pervasively subordinates the worker to supervisors and the machine.  
An acceleration of working rhythms and the spatial reorganisation of assembly lines were also a 
direct outcome of the implemented just-in-time. In practice, this influenced both the spatial 
configuration of production sites, and the organisation of the labour process. Inside the large factory, 
the pursuit of “leaner” structures led to both the optimisation of times and spaces on the assembly 
line, and to the vertical disintegration of manufacturing operations. This also meant the externalisation 
of the production of most components through outsourcing and sub-contracting to smaller suppliers 
located outside the large assembly plant. Such processes not only involved a reshaping of geographical 
settings, but also affected the workforce. For example, outsourcing meant not only cutting production 
costs, but also reducing labour costs. It meant shoving workers to firms generally dispensing lower 
salaries, forcing them into more precarious employment relations, and into more “flexible” labour 
regulations that often provided less protection. In countries like India, this has involved the 
contractualisation, informalisation and casualisation of the labour force in particularly harsh ways, and 
a progressive move from more protected and regulated to less protected and less regulated segments. 
On the global level, outsourcing was a key part of the exportation of the Toyota lean system abroad, 
within a trend that has seen labour being progressively pushed down the production chain, confined 
to lower wages, less job security and poorer working conditions (Moody, 1997). 
In the Maruti case, the introduction of the lean model was channelled by the first partnership 
with the Japanese company Suzuki in the early 1980s. What was greeted as the “Maruti revolution” 
(Ishigami, 2004) undoubtedly entailed an injection of capital, new technology and innovative 
management techniques into the Indian industry (D’Costa, 1995). Symbolically, the newly born Maruti 
Suzuki chose the industrial area in Gurgaon–Manesar (NCR) as an ideal greenfield site on which to 
build new plants, train a new workforce according to the new company values, and implement a new 
managerial mission. In the factory, the organisation of production in the name of flexibility entailed a 
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redistribution of tasks between assemblers and suppliers (through frequent outsourcing), increasing 
automation, a reduction in the number of workstations, and a faster, never-stopping assembly line (Jha 
and Chakraborty, 2012, 2014). In practice, as workers from the Maruti Manesar plant testified during 
the survey conducted in 2012, this resulted in an extremely fast speed on the line, continuous and 
repetitive operations, and control and harassment on behalf of contractors and supervisors meant to 
secure flawless operations (author’s own field survey, 2012). In addition, direct accounts collected 
through focus groups report breaks of only seven minutes, compulsory overtime of up to two hours 
per day, punishments and salary deductions for every minute of delay, forbidden communication 
among workers and frequent harassment on the line.6 Maruti’s flexible production was thus achieved 
through very intense working rhythms, strictly controlled operations and an extremely disciplined 
workplace. The necessary discipline was also maintained through strategies aimed at keeping the 
workforce fragmented and depoliticised, and the factory as free as possible from political interference. 
As we will see in the next sections, these involved the initial selection of a greenfield site without a 
rooted union tradition, repeated attempts to prevent the formation of new unions, the extensive 
employment of a casual workforce and, particularly in the end, the use of police repression and 
institutional violence as coercive tools. However, such strategies did not always succeed: before 
eventually regaining terrain, they encountered significant resistance and were properly challenged.  
 
 
NCR Auto Workers and the Contract Labour Issue: An Explosive Potential? 
Besides the working conditions experienced in the Maruti factory, the composition of workers in the 
NCR auto cluster may also explain why the situation became unsustainable and why the apparent 
industrial peace7 on which Maruti had built its lean model eventually collapsed. Here, the overall picture 
is derived from a questionnaire survey on “Working and Living Conditions in the NCR Auto Sector” 
carried out in the spring of 2012. This covered six original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and 
thirteen component suppliers,8 for a total of 140 valid responses.9  
In order to understand the profile of the surveyed workforce it is important to first consider the 
context in which the 2011/2012 Maruti strikes broke out. As mentioned earlier, within the NCR, the 
Gurgaon–Manesar area was originally chosen as a greenfield site in which to establish new plants (one 
opened in 2000, one in 2006) and to build an industrial township around Maruti. Initially, the cluster 
                                                          
6 Interviews were personally conducted with representatives from all the national unions active in the Gurgaon– 
Faridabad area, and focus groups with workers from both the Gurgaon and Manesar Maruti plants were held 
in the months between March and August 2012. For further reports, see also GWN (Undated), FMS (2011), 
PUDR (2013) and ICLR (2013). Reporting on factory conditions in excellent detail, the People’s Union for 
Democratic Rights (PUDR, 2013) describes a “dehumanisation” of the workforce, which is compelled to meet 
the target of one car every 42 seconds, even if this means insufficient time to rest within and between shifts, 
physically draining rhythms, no paid overtime and no leave. 
7 Interview with Maruti manager, Delhi, 6 September 2012. 
8 Questionnaires were collected anonymously, and firms were anonymised during data processing.  
9 The questionnaire was composed of four main sections: A) personal details (gender, age, education, origin); 
B) working conditions (workstation, shift, facilities, safety, contract, salary); C) living conditions (family, 
commuting, living expenses, social benefits); D) labour rights/organisation (union membership, personal 
opinions on general strike, etc.). 
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attracted investment and foreign companies not only for its good infrastructure provision, its proximity 
to the Delhi retail market and decision-making centres, and the available pool of skilled workers 
(Narayanan and Vashist, 2008), but also for its advantages as a newly industrialised area. This included 
the possibility for OEMs launching new assembly plants to hire a young workforce – in their first 
employment and with no memory or experience of previous struggles, and in an area that did not yet 
have a particularly rooted union tradition (author’s own field interviews, 2012). 
Indeed, our survey confirms the presence of a young, educated workforce, with relatively short 
employment relations. Workers’ age gaps, education levels and duration of employment can be 
observed in Figures 1, 2 and 3. As we shall see when discussing the strike demands and dynamics in 
the next section, the workers’ young age, good education levels and lack of political experience, while 
part of the advantage sought by the employing companies, also played a role in pushing the workers 
to take action. Indeed, they affected the workers’ expectations in terms of living standards, which 
clashed with their actual working conditions, and probably the way they dealt with the escalation of 
the industrial conflict. Other interesting findings that can help interpret what happened at Maruti 
concern the supposed fragmentation of the workforce as per the origin and status of the workers, and 
their average remuneration. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012. 
 
Figure 1: Composition of workers by overall age group 
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Notes: 10th and 12th = Grades 10 and 12; I.T.I. = Industrial Education Institute. 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012 
 
Figure 2: Composition of workers by education level 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012. 
 
Figure 3:  Composition of workers by duration of employment 
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As far as the workers’ states of origin are concerned, our sample came from fifteen different states (see 
Figure 4). 
 
 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012. 
 
Figure 4: Composition of workers by state of origin 
 
 
 
It must be noted that, although almost half of the workforce were from the state of Haryana, 48 per 
cent of workers came from different parts of the subcontinent, indicating a substantial proportion of 
migrant labour. If different origins of labour may play a limited role in fragmenting the workforce 
coming from the “Hindi Belt”, this could also play a more significant divisive role for workers from 
Southern or Eastern states. In terms of employment strategies, the use of migrant labour was expected 
to act as a deterrent to workers’ organising and engagement in struggles, due to different cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds and the frequent need to financially support families back home.10 
Another major line of segmentation related to the employment status of the workforce (Figure 
                                                          
10 Interviews with CITU, AITUC, NTUI, Delhi, 2012.  
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5). Despite limitations in approaching respondents,11 it is clear from the sample that almost a third of 
workers held non-permanent positions (13 per cent casual, temporary or contract workers, and 12 per 
cent apprentices/trainees). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012.  
 
Figure 5: Composition of workers by status of employment 
 
 
 
The existence of workers of different employment statuses, experiencing not only very different wage 
levels but also different degrees of social protection and often differential access to political 
representation, must be ascribed to a widespread process of casualisation in the area and to the specific 
issue of contract labour. The latter has emerged powerfully in the last few years, finally appearing on 
the agenda of national general strikes organised by major union federations, and even prompting casual 
workers to bravely fight on the forefront – as the story told in the next section will show. The nature 
of the problem surfaces distinctly if we consider the extent of the contractualisation process within 
Indian manufacturing (see Figure 6), the use (and abuse) of contract labour in relation to the existing 
law, and the working conditions endured by contract workers.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11The majority of workers approached to complete the questionnaires, and those who helped to distribute them, 
were selected through unions that acted as facilitators. This might have caused a bias in the direction of more 
permanent and unionised workers, who would be less concerned than casual workers in terms of political 
exposure in a period of unrest and tension.  
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Source: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2014:2.) 
 
Figure 6: Contract workers in Indian organised manufacturing 
 
 
The increasing share of informal, “more flexible” labour within Indian organised manufacturing has 
been documented widely by extensive studies. Deshpande et al. (2004), for example, report how the 
use of non-permanent workers has particularly intensified within large firms employing 500 or more 
workers. Convincingly overcoming the conceptualisation of a dualism between organised and 
unorganised segments, the authors illustrate how a process of casualisation has progressively 
permeated the formal sector through an overt substitution of permanent workers with temporary, 
casual, contract labour. In the NCR case, this process not only helps the employer increase profits by 
lowering costs, but is generally pursued to “manage industrial relations in an orderly manner” 
(Deshpande et al., 2004: 85). This trend is confirmed by Barnes, Lal Das and Pratap (2015), who show 
how the widespread adoption of a contract labour system in the NCR not only allows firms to reduce 
costs, but ultimately works as a strategy of labour control in which collective bargaining and trade 
union rights are frequently denied. Indeed, as it also emerges through our survey findings, we see the 
rooted practice of remunerating casual workers with wages much lower than those paid to their 
permanent counterparts (see Table 1). Employers are seeking to maximise the use of casual workers 
as they are easier to dismiss and, according to the existing law, generally not entitled to union 
membership.  
 
 
Table 1: Minimum and maximum salary per group of companies (in INR per month) 
Group Min salary Max salary 
OEMs 4 000 60 000 
Vendors 7 000 28 000 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012.  
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Considering the NCR, a process of “casualisation by substitution” has clearly taken place following all 
the major labour struggles. For example, after the 2000 Maruti Gurgaon strikes, the company 
terminated more than 2 000 employees, replacing them with contract workers.12 Within an overall 
process of informalisation of the organised manufacturing segments, the rising employment of 
contract workers has been particularly prominent. Together with non-permanent workers, contract 
workers can be classified as a specific category of casual/non- regular employment (Deshpande et al., 
2004). As with all casual workers, contract workers tend to receive lower wages and more restricted 
social benefits, and generally cannot subscribe to union organisations, keeping them excluded from 
political representation. In addition, they are distinguished by their “indirect” nature: they are hired by 
a third party and are not directly connected to the main company in terms of employment relationship 
and methods of wage payment. Normally, they should be hired, supervised and remunerated by a 
contractor, who in turn is generally compensated by the “mother company” (AIOE, 2013).  
 
 
 
Source: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2014:3) 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of contract workers by productive sector 
 
 
The reason why the contract labour system has recently become a matter of contention and generated 
widespread protest has to do with its over-use and abuse, in overt violation of the existing Contract 
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970.13 Firstly, the increasing and extensive employment of 
contract workers has occurred despite the legal limitations forbidding its use within “core activities” 
and on works of “perennial nature” (Papola, 2013). In addition, the system has channelled the creation 
                                                          
12 From an interview with the leader of the 2000 Maruti strike, Delhi, 26 August 2012. 
13 In recent years, amendments have been proposed to overcome the “rigidities” of the act, but the original act 
is still in force. For example, in March 2016, the Haryana State passed four amendments to allow easier lay-offs 
by enterprises with more than 300 employees, and to increase the number of contract workers permitted. See 
http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/haryana-pushes-for-change-in-labour-laws-passes-4-bills.  
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of a separate category of workers, employed at cheaper rates and excluded from social security 
schemes, despite the Contract Labour Act’s requirement to provide contract workers with regular 
salaries and at least minimum social benefits (Papola, 2013). Thus, in spite of supposed restrictions, 
the use of contract labour within organised manufacturing has grown considerably, increasing from 
about 20 per cent in 2000/2001 to 33 per cent in 2009/2010 (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2014; Papola, 
2013: 22; see also Figure 7). Within the whole auto industry, more than a third of the workers currently 
seem to be employed on a contract basis.14 At company level, especially within large firms, the share 
of contract workers has sometimes – illegally – outnumbered that of permanent workers. Concerning 
the NCR auto factories, union representatives report 60 per cent of contract workers at Honda and 
over 90 per cent at Hero Honda Haridwar (author’s own field interviews, NCR, 2012), while PUDR 
(2013) states that, by the time of the 2012 strikes, Maruti employed at least 40 per cent contract 
workers, and over 60 per cent at the Manesar plant. Today, Maruti seem to have adopted yet another 
shade of casualisation: following the extensive protests in 2012, thousands of contract workers were 
turned into “company casuals”, hired directly by the company and no longer through a contractor, but 
still on casual terms (GWN, Undated; Youth Kiawaaz, 2017). Publicised as a move to limit the 
employment of contract workers and their continuous in-sourcing, this strategy actually seems to be a 
way to maintain the advantages of casual labour while exercising more direct control over it. 
Beyond the high number of non-regular employees, the system itself rests on diffused 
irregularities and violations. These include protracted rolling-over of contracts in cases where workers 
should be made permanent, salaries below the statutory minimum wage and lower than permanent 
counterparts despite the performance of identical tasks, as well as a lack of written agreements, absence 
of paid leave and denial of social security schemes.15 
In addition to the harsh working conditions, the insecurity related to the frequent employment 
on casual terms and, as we shall see, the continuous opposition to workers organising, another 
important factor to consider is the level of remuneration in an area with increasing living costs. The 
survey findings on wage levels for 2012 are reported in Table 1. As can be observed in the figures 
shown in the table, there is a huge disparity between minimum and maximum salaries, with a much 
wider gap in OEMs compared to vendors. Within the gaps themselves, salaries range from about one-
fourth of the minimum wage set by the State of Haryana (15 000 INR) to four times the minimum 
wage. This is explained by the presence, at the lower end, of poorly paid “helpers” (production 
assistants used as support on the line), while at the upper end a few engineers or older workers who 
have matured seniority benefits (in the plants of older formation) shift the maximum upwards. In 
addition, it is interesting to report the recorded salary gap between permanent and casual workers, 
which was 21 281 vs 6 083 INR in 2012 (author’s own survey, 2012).16 Finally, recorded salary levels 
can be compared with declared average living expenses (Table 2). Although the amounts represent 
averages, they are sufficiently explanatory to conclude that the salary levels of casual/contract workers 
are very inadequate. Of course, averages do not express the real gaps and the actual disparities in living 
standards that characterise the Gurgaon region. While old Gurgaon, where most workers live, is still a 
                                                          
14 Interview, Prof. Dev Nathan, ISLE Delhi, November 2011. 
15 For example, they are often denied bonuses, insurance, medical assistance and pension schemes related to 
Provident Funds and the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme. 
16 Later raised, following the massive protests. 
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village with poor housing, bad roads and poor facilities, the newly built part of Gurgaon is connected 
to “shining India” through the brand-new Delhi metro. Malls and office buildings mushroom all 
around, and living costs skyrocket accordingly.17 
 
 
Table 2: Average monthly expenses (in INR) 
Expenses Monthly average 
Housing 7 211.34 
Food 5 266.67 
Medical care 1 310.00 
Transportation 1 590.21 
Education 3 647.37 
Extra 3 049.21 
Total 22 074.80 
Source: Author’s own field survey, March/April 2012 
 
 
 
Maruti’s Unrest: Beyond Divisions and Traditional Representation 
After a series of relatively milder strikes that affected the NCR in the 2000s, the unrest that broke out 
at the Maruti Manesar plant in 2011/2012 exploded as a powerful warning signal, drawing wide 
attention not only to the Maruti lean model, but more broadly to the “Indian way” of factory 
management and industrial development. Within the discussion developed so far, it represents a 
particularly meaningful case, considering that the whole Gurgaon auto cluster developed around the 
myth of the “Maruti revolution” (Ishigami, 2004), and that Maruti still proudly claims to found its 
management and production strategies on the principles of Total Quality Management, to use the 
kaizen methodology with the idea of achieving continuous improvements by involving all workers, and 
to focus on teamwork and a just-in-time structure.18 However, despite the favourable conditions and 
the optimal location, the NCR “industrial peace” soon collapsed. Starting from the oldest Maruti 
Udyog Limited (MUL) plant in Gurgaon (2000), followed by Honda (2005) and RICO (2009), and 
culminating in the intense Maruti Manesar strikes in 2011/2012, a whole series of labour struggles 
highlighted the inconsistencies, contradictions and weaknesses of the Maruti-style industrial model.19  
Overall, this series of strikes denounced a regime based on strict labour control, on fierce anti-
union behaviour and on state–management connivance in the modalities of repression. Such issues 
                                                          
17 Lower-paid, mostly casual workers generally live in rooms shared with two, three or four other workers in 
one of the villages close to the factory plants, where rents are cheaper but houses are overcrowded and 
water/electricity provision can be poor. I personally visited workers living in the Aliyar workers’ village in 
Manesar, in April 2012, together with some activists from the Gurgaon Workers News .   
18 From an interview with a Maruti Suzuki India Ltd manager, Delhi, 6 September 2012. For an interesting 
reading on the “Maruti formula – lean manufacturing”, see FMS (2011).   
19 From an interview with a representative of NTUI Haryana, 22 March 2012.   
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also emerged throughout the 2011/2012 Maruti strike, which even more powerfully laid bare the actual 
implications of the factory regime built in the area, and was also exceptional for its duration, its intensity 
and its conclusions. On the whole, in the period from June 2011 to July 2012, the Manesar protest 
involved two main factory occupations, tool-down strikes, a 33-day company lock-out, dismissals and 
suspensions, and militarisation of the area through a fence erected outside the factory premises (GWN, 
Undated; PUDR, 2013). Eventually, after more than thirteen months of arm-wrestling, open and 
“underground” negotiations, threats and imposed conditions,20 the strike ended with an “accident”. 
On 18 July 2012, an altercation between a worker and a supervisor ended with the worker’s suspension, 
which generated widespread tension and a collective reaction. Violence broke out in the Manesar plant, 
also involving a fire in which an HR manager died and several workers were injured (PUDR, 2013). 
This resulted in blanket arrests and fierce repression: within a month, the employment of 546 
permanent and 1 800 contract workers was terminated and almost 150 workers were jailed, including 
all union leaders.21 Although it was proven that the arrests were executed randomly and there never 
was a fair trial or official conviction, and despite media involvement and pressure from outside, 148 
workers were kept in jail until March 2015,22 with violence, torture and abuses reported throughout 
their detention (ICLR, 2013). Only very recently, on 10 March 2017, a final sentence was pronounced: 
thirteen workers were charged with murder and eighteen with rioting, and the rest were acquitted. 
Among those accused of murder, who can thus be condemned to the highest sentence, were the main 
leaders and office bearers of the union (Hindustan Times, 2017; Times of India, 2017; Youth Kiawaaz, 
2017).  
Besides the intensity and modalities of the struggles, what was extremely peculiar in the Maruti 
case was the composition of the workers who engaged in the strike and the demands they forwarded. 
Eventually, the legal outcome of the process makes the dispute particularly powerful in unveiling 
corporate strategies of labour control, where the system shakes, and how it reacts violently.  
Concerning the profile of the workers who took action, it corresponds to the main findings of 
our survey on workforce composition: they were impressively young, educated and, most strikingly, 
largely employed on casual terms. The plant where the strike broke out is in fact the Maruti Suzuki, a 
plant in IMT Manesar, inaugurated in 2006. When it opened, the company recruited the majority of 
workers directly from industrial education institutes and technical colleges, thus securing a pool of 
young, skilled and “committed” workers – a generation of workers who have become the symbol of 
the modernising “shining India”, striving for growth, progress and personal achievement; a generation 
of workers who were supposed to be easy to control, as they were not yet politicised, within an area 
relatively free from established unions; a generation of workers, however, who soon experienced the 
alienation of backbreaking work on the line, and saw rosy aspirations clashing with the reality of 
rampant casualisation and the brutality of an oppressive management (The Indian Express, 2011). In this 
sense, the tough working conditions and the relentless rhythms imposed by the Maruti lean factory 
seem to have proven particularly unbearable. 
                                                          
20 Like the signature of a good conduct undertaking (GCU) as a condition to be re-allowed into the factory 
premises after the strikes (from an interview with one of the leaders of the 2000 Maruti strike, held in Delhi on 
26 August 2012).   
21 From an interview with the leader of the 2000 Maruti strike, Delhi, 26 August 2012. 
22 News from March 2015 reports that 81 workers were finally granted bail of 25 000 INRs, while more than 60 
were still in detention at the Bhondsi jail in Gurgaon. Read (Business Standard, 2015; IndustriALL, 2015).   
 
Global Labour Journal, 2017, 8(2), Page 134 
 
The large proportion of casual workers involved in the Maruti strike was indeed a very surprising, 
peculiar feature. Despite the higher vulnerability of their positions and the precariousness of their 
employment relations, these workers did not hesitate to take action, and actually appeared on the 
frontline. Overall, the expected fragmentation between workers of different statuses did not prevent 
permanent and casual workers from striking together, within an incredibly inspiring manifestation of 
unity and solidarity, hardly observed before.23 In this sense, if the lower salaries and greater exposure 
to dismissals and terminations could have acted as deterrents, discouraging precarious workers from 
personal involvement in a strike, the Maruti events proved all expectations wrong. Likewise, if the 
employment of workers under different conditions and the concession of separate treatments might 
have created expectations of different needs and aspirations, rivalries and different willingness to fight, 
Maruti’s ground reality also proved significantly different. Eventually, the perception of a common 
identity developed in a context of generalised exploitation and widespread oppression seems to have 
overcome all other forms of workforce segmentation that might have encumbered labour organising. 
The composition of the striking workers also helps explain the demands raised in the Maruti 
protest. These revolved around two main claims: the recognition of an independent union, and the 
regularisation of contract workers. The request to form a union is connected to several issues. First, 
the autonomous initiative to form an independent union, in early 2011, and the long struggle until this 
was finally registered, on 1 March 2012, shows that the young, inexperienced Maruti workers gained 
collective awareness of their own conditions and developed a common political subjectivity. This 
entailed the acknowledgement of diffused exploitation, unjust employment relations and uneven 
power balances, up to the determination to act together in order to affirm collective rights. Although 
still at an early stage, this may be seen as the development of a common class consciousness where it 
was previously absent. Second, the need to establish a union seems both a response to the perceived 
lack of political representation, as well as an ultimate solution to address unbearable working 
conditions. Indeed, denunciations regarding the dehumanising conditions experienced on the line 
emerged vociferously throughout the entire strike, and the formation of a union came forth in the 
hope that what had long been silenced would finally come to the surface (PUDR, 2013). Third, it is 
important to note that the demand for an independent union did not happen in a vacuum, but came 
as a reaction to the long-lasting imposition of a “company union”, a pre-existing management-friendly 
union whose leaders were selected by the company itself, with no involvement of the workers. In this 
sense, the request to recognise the Maruti Suzuki Employees’ Union (MSEU), as opposed to the 
previous Maruti Udyog Kamgar Union (MUKU), discloses a situation of diffused political control and 
lack of democratic consultation, in which not only were union leaders directly chosen by the 
management, but no election was ever held. Finally, the initial absence of a workers’ union, the 
protracted attempts to invalidate its registration, plus the subsequent retaliation targeting those 
recognised as its leaders, can all be included in a generalised hostility towards labour organisations and 
particularly accentuated within multinational companies championing the Japanese model of 
“collaborative industrial relations”.24  
With regard to the second core demand expressed by the Maruti strike, namely the regularisation 
                                                          
23 Emerged from interviews held with all Gurgaon unions. 
24 A trend that was already clearly expressed in the Honda case a few years earlier. The longstanding hostility of 
Japanese management was clearly reported during discussions held with all unions active in the Gurgaon area. 
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of contract workers, this must be analysed within the system we described in the previous section. The 
widespread employment of contract workers – and, following recent strikes, of “company casuals” – 
in the NCR now seems to be the norm rather than the exception. The regular replacement of 
permanent workers in the aftermath of each protest, the massive retrenchments, and the shift back to 
“in-house” casuals, testify to the use of casualisation as an expressly political tool, which goes well 
beyond economic justifications. In this sense, Maruti’s casual workers demonstrated not only a clear 
awareness of their conditions and a willingness to fight for better ones, but also an unwillingness to 
buy into management’s divisive strategies by building bonds of solidarity with their permanent 
colleagues and struggling together.  
Overall, what the Maruti protest powerfully disclosed was not only the actual scope of the 
“Maruti lean model”, but also its limitations and potential weaknesses. Indeed, it not only laid bare the 
intensification of working rhythms, the unbearable conditions on the line, and the miserable 
remuneration of a segment of the workforce supposed to be “protected” and almost privileged 
compared to other industrial sectors. It also revealed the fallacy of the lean idea of consensus as nothing 
but an imposed, deceitful industrial peace built on labour control, forced de-politicisation and division. 
In this sense, the case unveiled, on the one hand, the strategic selection of a well-defined workforce 
and an (initially) politically neutral location; on the other hand, it showed clear efforts to obstruct 
unionisation and to lower costs while controlling labour through extensive casualisation. Eventually, 
the bar was raised even higher. The latest convictions, added to years of arbitrary detentions, the clear 
targeting of union officials and the threatening messages sent to all the workers in the area “not to do 
like Maruti” reveal the use of coercion and intimidation, an institutionalisation of violence beyond 
limits. Indeed, the shift to what Burawoy defines as hegemonic despotism is now evident (Burawoy, 
1985; Stewart et al., 2004; Pulignano and Stewart, 2008). Consensus is not even formally demanded, 
and the use of coercive methods appears distinctly.  
However, the case also shows how corporate strategies can encounter obstacles. Overall, the 
evident gap between the lean rhetoric and the local working and living conditions, the indiscriminate 
use (and abuse) of the contract labour system, the mismatch between actual possibilities of social 
reproduction and the aspiration of the young, educated working class, and the repeated attempts to 
prevent labour organising, rather than building a competitive advantage, resulted in an unprecedented 
wave of antagonism and indicated where the system can potentially be shaken. In this sense, despite 
lean’s powerful rhetoric aimed at controlling labour, insubordination remains persistent and 
unresolved. 
 
 
What Lessons can be Learned? 
Within a study of production and management strategies implemented in the global auto industry and 
expressed by some of the most recent applications of the Japanese lean manufacturing paradigm, the 
case of the Indian Maruti Suzuki was chosen as being significantly revealing. In particular, an analysis 
of the strikes that affected the company in 2011/2012 was deemed meaningful for several reasons. 
Firstly, an analysis of the Maruti case contributes to highlighting the discrepancy between lean as 
hegemonic narrative and its lived experiences, as well as its real implications for those who allow the 
model to actually function – the workers. Once again, lean emerged as a rhetorical apparatus disclosing 
a profoundly ideological scope, visible in the managerial attempts to control, fragment and depoliticise 
labour. Secondly, the story of the Maruti unrest was chosen as epitomising the ultimate frontier of 
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labour exploitation and control, namely the reliance on labour regimes based on high levels of 
casualisation.  
On the one hand, this responds to the relentless need of companies to lower costs in order to 
secure higher returns to capital, which are particularly acute in times of crisis. On the other, it provides 
a brilliant opportunity to further fragment and depoliticise labour through structural impediments to 
labour organising. However, while globally pursued as a competitive advantage, widespread 
casualisation may also represent an actual threat to managerial control, the weak point where the lean 
strategy may be attacked. In this sense, and against all expectations, it was the large number of casual 
workers employed by Maruti and the abuses of the contract labour system that actually triggered the 
crisis. Ultimately, the extensive use of contract labour, the employment of a selected workforce 
supposed to remain docile and not politicised, and the strenuous efforts to prevent unionisation 
contributed to the formation of a collective political consciousness that manifested in an 
unprecedented form of antagonism. In this regard, important lessons can be learned in the global 
struggle against casualisation, and on how solidarity can play a crucial role.  
Finally, the case also shows how the emergent movement failed to acquire a proper modus vivendi, 
an organised subjectivity able to protect it from the degeneration of the struggle. In fact, in the absence 
of an adequate political and legal network giving proper resonance to the case, an event that started as 
an accident was eventually used by management to orchestrate the heaviest onslaught. Here, the case 
shows how the lean system, even when shaking, can react strongly. And it does so by seeking 
institutional support through the use of coercion, to the point of violently silencing dissent. In this 
sense, Indian industrial relations seem to have taken a dangerous turn, one which will have to be 
radically opposed. 
Overall, despite the dramatic outcome of the case, many lessons can be learned, and the Maruti 
workers can still be an example for many others who are willing to fight back. 
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